Global governance is a highly contested concept both in terms of how it is defined and the desirability of its different forms. By one view – often considered a “European” one – global governance is synonymous with formalised and “effective multilateralism.” An alternative view – frequently aired in Washington – is that formal multilateral institutions are only one means to achieve global governance, and often are inferior to more informal, flexible forms of cooperation. This paper considers contending definitions of global governance, as well as different forms it takes in the four realms singled out for investigation by Transworld: security, economy, human rights and the environment. We conclude that global governance is in a state of considerable flux, that it must be pragmatic and not based exclusively on treaty-based international organizations, and that Europe and America still retain considerable capacity to supply demand it.

Global Governance: Promise, Patterns, Prospects

John Peterson and Meltem Müftüler-Baç
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John Peterson and Meltem Müftüler-Baç*

Introduction

What will the global order look like in 30 years? What distribution of power do we expect to see, both between major powers (or blocs of them) and between states and international organisations (IOs)? Which states or blocs will most powerfully shape global dynamics and the rules of the game? In short, what is the future of global governance?

Global governance is a highly contested concept both in terms of how it is defined and the desirability of its different forms. By one view, it is simply a way of dealing with global problems and the management of international affairs within institutionalised multilateral settings. A step level change has occurred in the complexity of the most existential problems that states face, to the point where individual governments have little chance of solving them on their own. Thus they coordinate their policies, make policy commitments, and agree methods of enforcement. The challenges now span a broad range of issue-areas – including security, economics, environmental protection, and human rights – necessitating inclusive, participatory, and consensus-based multilateral cooperation.

Especially in the last decade, it has become clear that security concerns such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism (Walt 2005), economic interdependence as manifest in trade, migration and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (Niblett 2010), environmental degradation, and global demands for justice and liberty pose primordial challenges to the global order. The logical response is the sort of institutionalised multilateralism on a global scale that the European Union (EU) has achieved (or at least aspires to) regionally. By this view, global governance is synonymous with formalised and “effective multilateralism” (see Bouchard et al 2013).

An alternative view is that formal multilateral institutions are only one means to achieve global governance, and often are inferior to more informal, flexible forms of cooperation. Advocates of this view do not deny that globalisation creates rising demand for international cooperation (see Bouchard and Peterson 2011:4). Rather, they insist that it must be supplied in novel and creative ways given the lack of international consensus that

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must exist before new multilateral institutions may be created or existing ones reformed. Now is not a “present at the creation moment” analogous to the early post-war period when the United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods institutions, and (what became) the EU were created (see Acheson 1987, Ikenberry 2001). Besides, most existing IOs are sclerotic, bureaucratic, and resistant to change. Thus, “effective multilateral responses are increasingly occurring outside formal institutions, as frustrated actors turn to more convenient, ad hoc venues” (Patrick 2014:58-9). Formal IOs and informal, transnational networks rarely – if ever – stand alone: agreements forged in one IO or network usually refers to action planned or hoped for in another. The end result is often messy, unwieldy and a long way from being maximally efficient. But, for advocates of more nimble, flexible cooperation, it constitutes “good enough” global governance (Patrick 2014, see also Kaye 2013, Hill and Peterson 2013).

In the context of transatlantic relations, it is tempting to designate the first view of global governance as a European one, and the latter as one that holds sway in Washington. After all, “international co-operation [is] seen by the EU and generally its member states as a matter of necessity (both for the sake of the EU and for the broader global good) [yet] is seen by US policy-makers as a matter of choice […] a largely instrumental position within the conduct of US international policies” (Smith 2011:268).

Yet, simple and binary attributions ignore much complexity in debates about global governance, while also creating a false dichotomy.1 American and European visions of global governance clearly overlap more than do, say, those of either’s with China’s (see Bouchard and Peterson 2011:25-9). But what matters most in getting to grips with the state of global governance is to understand how debates have evolved since the concept first became of a subject of serious study by international relations (IR) scholars. It is also essential to examine different constellations of co-operation in different policy domains. We can only know where global governance might be heading – and what might be the role of the transatlantic partners in steering it – if we understand from where we are starting.

This paper proceeds in five sections. Section 1 interrogates contending definitions of governance, both in its global manifestation as well as more generally. Subsequent sections (2-5) seek to map existing global governance structures in the four policy domains selected for investigation within Transworld: security, economics, environmental protection and human rights. The exercise favours breadth over depth – since other work within Transworld goes into greater detail in specific domains – particularly to determine the balance between global governance within existing, formal IOs or more informal cooperative arrangements. Our conclusion offers reflections on the future prospects of global governance.


To say that the origins and meaning of the term global governance are disputed is an understatement. What is clear is that governance, without the qualifier “global,” first emerged as a preoccupation of public policy and administration scholars seeking to describe and explain how modern states and government had changed beginning in the late 1980s. Governance only “went global” several years later, particularly as IR scholars

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1 To illustrate, a widely-read US text on global governance, which has gone through four editions, focuses almost exclusively on institutionalised, multilateral IOs (Diehl and Frederking 2010). Meanwhile, Hill and Peterson (2013) argue that Europe’s experience of multilateralism features abundant ad-hoc-ism and unwieldiness. See also Pollack 2003.
sought to cope with the meaning of the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, Patrick (2014:59) misleads (at best) when he seeks to contrast governance globally with its domestic variant: “In domestic politics, governance is straightforward. It is provided by actual governments – formal, hierarchical institutions with the authority to establish and enforce binding rules.” More helpful in specifying what is different about the global variant is the title given to a seminal work on global governance: _Governance without Government_ (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992).

Etymologically, governance derives from the Greek terms _kybenan_ and _kybemetes_, meaning “to steer” and “pilot/helmsman” (Rosenau 1995:14). Its first use was probably by Plato in _The Republic_, given its aim to contrast an ideal with inferior forms of governance. The modern “bible” on the concept – Rhodes’ _Understanding Governance_ – acknowledges that the term “has too many meanings to be useful” but insists that it implies “a change in the meaning of government […] a _new_ process of governing.” He then offers a definition of his own: “self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state […] Fragmentation and centralization coexist. There is persistent tension between the wish for authoritative action and dependence on the compliance and actions of others” (Rhodes 1997:15).

Citing the same source (and others), one of Al Gore’s top advisors draws the conclusion that “governance without government is becoming the dominant pattern of management for advanced industrial democracies” (Kamarck 2002:231). As such, governance appears a concept that easily travels from the domestic to global level.

But things are not so simple. Rosenau’s (1992:4) path-breaking volume contains not a single mention of global governance (Hewson and Sinclair 1999:6). It does, however, contrast governance with _government_ and makes clear that governance “is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority (or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects).”

Subsequently, Finkelstein (1995:367) complained that ambiguity still existed about what was meant by governance or even the adjective “global” Rosenau’s (1995:13) definition – “systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions” – incorporated “virtually anything.” An alternative formulation was thus offered: “Global governance is governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home” (Finkelstein 1995:368, 369). Predictably, Rosenau (1999:288) retorted that “[s]uch a formulation amply demonstrates the large extent to which we remain imprisoned by the idea that the line dividing domestic and foreign affairs still serves as the cutting edge of analysis.”

Two recent works bring the definitional debate up-to-date. One is Fukuyama’s (2013) essay with the seemingly straightforward title _What is Governance?_ Here, one of the world’s leading IR scholars immediately admits that he is concerned with “good governance” and how to conceptualise it. As such, governance is defined as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services” (Fukuyama 2013:350). It is “thus about
execution, or what has traditionally fallen within the domain of public administration, as opposed to politics or public policy” (Fukuyama 2013:351). Scholars of governance, especially its global variety, can only sigh at another unhelpful (re)definition that occurs for reasons the author admits “were poorly or incompletely articulated on my part.”

However, the exercise at least reminds us that, for the EU (and, less explicitly, the US), any debate about governance quickly shifts to one about how ‘good governance’ can be achieved, both internally (see European Commission 2001) and by designing external policy incentives that reward others who embrace it (Zanger 2000).

Another, recent, massive (728 pages) work purports to be “the most comprehensive textbook available” on global governance. It begins with an admission that “we as a community of scholars have not really put international organization and global governance together very well to date” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014:5). The closest it gets to a definition of global governance is to offer that “[s]cale-wise, global governance refers to the totality of the ways, formal and informal, in which the world is governed” (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014:9). Here, we find a truly modern definition that emphasizes how much governance of the international order is now not formal in the sense that it is the exclusive preserve of formal, multilateral IOs. To illustrate, a study of global governance and human security argues that “novel ‘multilateralisms’” – such as “processes” that seek to govern ozone-depletion, landmines, and conflict diamonds – “are more imperative than ever” (Shaw et al 2006:8). Other recent works point to the virtues of “stealth multilateralism” (Kaye 2013) and “good enough global governance” (Patrick 2014).

In short, there is widespread agreement that global governance must “rely more on regional organizations, ‘minilateral’ cooperation among relevant states, codes of conduct, and partnerships with nongovernmental actors” (Patrick 2014:59).

Our definitional tour d’horizon complete, we arrive at a point where we can give global governance meaning, and know it when we see it, by offering answers to questions that naturally arise. Why “global” governance? Perhaps other, more precise terms such as international, intergovernmental, or transnational should be employed as the qualifier instead of the vague term “global”? Perhaps what is implied is that global refers to issues, patterns, challenges, and concerns that states previously dealt within their own boundaries, but which they no longer can? Or does the term imply that the state-centric approaches to international relations no longer suffice to capture the roles of multiple, new, non-state actors on the international stage such as multinational firms, transnational business groups, non-governmental organisations and even terrorist networks? Not everyone agrees that “yes” is the answer to each of these questions. But a critical mass of IR scholars views the consequences of globalization as transformative to the point where the modern international order is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War. If so, then new and alternative modes of cooperation need to be established in order both to deal with the consequences of this transformation and to shape them in the process.

Perhaps one crucial way in which the new international order differs is in the calculations of states about how to respond to the “security dilemma” (see Booth and Wheeler 2008). In the past, anarchy was seen as motivating states to out-compete their rivals in spending on arms in order to try to maximise their security. Yet, in a globalized world, states compete for security more by investing in modern infrastructures and education and designing regulatory and taxation regimes that attract skilled people and investment in industries and services with high value-added, the potential for growth, and the provision of good jobs. They also must guard against the threat of catastrophic terrorism that emanates from transnational networks that often extend to their own nationals. Logically, states might react to the new security dilemma by cooperating instead of competing to

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5 Here we quote from a blog post by Fukuyama (http://wp.me/prMFR-o4) in which he responds to numerous and stinging criticisms of his article (http://wp.me/prMFR-Io). The whole exercise turns slightly farcical, with Fukuyama asserting that China’s economic model “is unsustainable and heading for a major crisis” unless China democratizes: “the handwriting is on the wall.”
lessen uncertainty, achieve a global distribution of scarce economic resources that is perceived as fair and governed by rules, and safeguard themselves from terrorism.

Meanwhile, despite Rosenau’s objection about assumptions that “imprison” us, scholars of nearly all theoretical bent concur that IR are different from domestic politics insofar as a central authority is absent. Anarchy persists and uncertainty prevails. States must find alternative paths since the institutional centralization of authority and monopoly on the legitimate use of force that states rely on for their internal security is unachievable. In the absence of world government, international institutions can reduce the uncertainty of anarchy by:

• generating knowledge about the possible costs and benefits of specific actions and;
• by altering the calculations of (recalling Rosenau) a majority of states (or at least the powerful ones) through rules that they generate.

However, the establishment of rules and the generation of information as to what happens to free riders who do not follow them depend largely upon the willingness of the most powerful players to cooperate. This willingness is ultimately tied to the ability of Great Powers to impose their own rules on the rest of the world.

Arguably, this is precisely what happened after World War II (Cowles and Egan 2012). The catalyst was a convergence of interests between the US and its European allies (Nye 2002, Walt 2005). It led to the establishment of the main instruments of today’s global governance: the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the IMF, NATO, and later on the World Trade Organization, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as (initially with the participation of the Soviet Union) non-proliferation regimes. The UN turned out to be a key cornerstone of the post-war institutional structure, with aspirations to act as a central authority in the international system.

Yet, long after the passing of the Cold War, which usually sidelined the UN, even ardent supporters of the UN system find that its journey towards becoming the ultimate authority in global governance remained, at best, “unfinished” (see Weiss and Thakur 2010). Meanwhile, the rise of the new powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil means that key stakeholders now contest the rules that have emerged and are sufficiently powerful to challenge existing constellations of global governance. In the circumstances, global governance must be “effective” and – especially with non-western states on the rise – reflect and promote (insofar as is possible) the basic principles of “good” governance – openness, participation, accountability, coherence and subsidiarity (European Commission 2001:7-8). Above all, far more cross-border exchange affecting far more stakeholders including far less autonomous states – with more contenders for Great Power status seeking to “steer” it – creates demand for governance in the absence of any government. And the demand is truly global.

The Transworld project has conducted research in four policy domains to assess the nature of global governance constellations; security, economy, human rights and the environment. Both formal and informal structures as well as global and regional constellations have been investigated. One notable finding is the growing importance of transnational and transgovernmental networks in the global governance architecture (Murray 2013, Renda 2013, Weiss 2013, Risse and Börzel 2012). An important concern is the degree of delegation to international networks. For example, although the EU represents a regional arrangement where supranational authority has gained significant autonomy over individual states, there are multiple international regimes where decisions are made jointly through consensus building among national actors (Müftüler-Baç and Cihangir 2012). The result is that enormous diversity now characterizes global governance, as summarised in the matrix below.
Governance structures | Global | Regional
--- | --- | ---
Formal | UNSC, IFIs, WTO, ICC, etc. | NATO, EU, SCO, ASEAN, AU, OSCE, ICTY
Informal | G7, G8, G20 | Contact groups (P5+1), coalitions of the willing, etc.

Source: UNSC = UN Security Council; IFIs = International Financial Institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.); ICC = International Criminal Court; SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organization; ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; AU = African Union; OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; ICTY = International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; G7, G8, G20 = Group of (N); P5+1 = UNSC permanent 5 members plus Germany.

2. Security and Global Governance

A turn towards diversity, which we have highlighted, can be most easily detected in global security governance. The most important visible manifestation of global power in this realm is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Yet, in the face of increasing discontent on the part of emerging powers, there is a contestation about its legitimacy. It is reflected in increased demand for participation and representation, specifically where representation is not equal as in the case of the United Nations General Assembly. Today’s security multilateralism at its highest level is reflected in UNSC structures that reflect the immediate post-war balance of power that is now nearly 70 years old. As Brzezinski (2012:76) argues, the “heretofore untouchable” UNSC, with its five permanent members with exclusive veto rights, “may become widely viewed as illegitimate” unless it is reformed. Brazil, India, Turkey are the most vocal proponents of a change in the UNSC while Russia and China – with their permanent memberships and veto power – are relatively silent. The table 1 below with a ranking of global powers illustrates the need for such reform.

- Table 1 | Countries Ranked by Military Strength, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Power index</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.2594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.3923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0.4706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.4899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.5171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.5536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>0.5887</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.6663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.7369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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6 The Global FirePower index compares 106 countries in the world based on 50 different factors ranging from their manpower, land, naval and air systems, logistical support, financial strength, resources to geography. It does not take nuclear capability into account. Based on these quantitative data, a power index score is calculated, with a perfect score being 0.0000. See Global FirePower website: http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
Of course, a key feature of global governance has been the security cooperation engendered by transatlantic relations since the end of World War II. Despite divergences over perceptions of security interests, it has survived as a key cornerstone of transatlantic partnership. The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 was a product of shared security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic in response to perceived Soviet expansionism during the Cold War (Müftüler-Baç and Cihangir 2012). Yet, it was not only the convergence of material security interests that bound the transatlantic allies together, but also their common values. The US and Europe emerged as the main global advocates of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the 21st century after the Soviet threat had receded (Manners 2010).

Although there are clear differences – broadly speaking – between their respective security (US) and value (EU) based approaches, the US and Europe still continue to be partners on many issues in international affairs (Herring 2008). This partnership endures despite disputes within the transatlantic alliance in the post-9/11 world, as seen in NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Iraq war, missile defence policy, relations with Russia (Howorth and Menon 2009, Asmus 2010), Iran, and Libya. Multiple policy successes in the security realm have resulted from bilateral dialogue between the US and EU – as opposed to cooperation within NATO – including on counterterrorism, homeland security, the western Balkans, and Afghan reconstruction (see Peterson et al 2005:23-6).

Transatlantic security relations have never been straightforward and have survived multiple crises in the postwar period (Cowles and Egan 2012). Now, in addition to a wide range of global issues that pose security threats (especially to Europe), such as illegal migration, trans-border organized crime and international terrorism, there is the existential threat associated with nuclear proliferation, which ultimately requires a military response and a nuclear deterrence capability that increases the importance of the transatlantic alliance and NATO’s role in international security. In this context, recent tensions in US-European security relations recede in significance because “NATO would provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces. Thus Washington chose to perfect the alliance’s military set up (implement the long-time-sought flexible response and the equitable sharing of defence burdens) rather than abandon the alliance. Many Europeans for their part still deemed the US commitment to Europe’s security important” (Athanassopoulou 2006:116).

Ultimately, NATO remains the most powerful and integrated military institution in the world, despite a growing military imbalance amongst its allies. In military terms, the power of Europe is in decline. Largely for that reason, the outgoing US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, cast doubt on the future of the transatlantic security alliance in 2011 while lambasting European states “that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense” (Gates 2011). But as the (increasingly) senior partner in the Atlantic Alliance, the US remains the dominant global leader in hard security resources and material. And despite being politically bruised and logistically stretched in Afghanistan and Libya, NATO held firm and showed its unmatched operational capability in both theatres.

Meanwhile, the military wings of other organizations such as Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and African Union (AU) are simply incomparable with NATO. To illustrate, the CSTO has been limited to joint military training exercises amongst its (as of 2014) six members.7 A condition of CSTO membership is that signatories must agree not to join any other (rival) military alliance and allow Russia – which clearly dominates the CSTO – to veto the setting up by non-members of military bases

7 The CSTO’s members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. See the official website (http://www.odkb-csto.org) which, revealingly, is available in Russian only.
on their territory. However, pre-existing American, German, and French military facilities continue to operate in CSTO member states and the alliance has seen numerous defections (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan) since its creation in 1992. Meanwhile, Russian membership in the CSTO precludes any attempt to give the SCO – which China has repeatedly insisted should remain a forum for strictly economic cooperation – any military dimension (see Bouchard and Peterson 2011:28-9).

The African Union is, in several ways, a more interesting case. It has developed enough capacity for peacekeeping to take on active security-enhancing roles in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia in the 2010s. However, the AU remains a nascent institution in terms of collective security in Africa, with nothing approaching NATO’s commitment to the principle of “an attack on one is an attack on all.” It also has required injections of resources (often from the UN) and superior western (French in the case of Mali) firepower before dispatching forces when there has been any peace to keep.

An arguably even more interesting case that illustrates heightened diversity in the security realm is the P5+1 framework for nuclear diplomacy with Iran. Very much a transatlantic creature – bringing together the US with Europe’s three leading powers (France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK)) and chaired by the EU – it also includes China and Russia. Critics charge that the P5+1 has been a diversionary talking shop that has allowed Iran to delay and obstruct while inexorably moving closer to a nuclear weapon capability. But its defenders can point to economic sanctions orchestrated through the P5+1 that cut Iranian oil exports by two-thirds, isolated Iran from financial markets, and caused severe pain in the form of rocketing Iranian inflation and unemployment. Developments in 2013 – first the election of the reformist (in relative terms) Hassan Rouhani as Iranian President and then an interim agreement trading some easing of sanctions for curbs on Iran’s nuclear programme – changed views amongst few of the P5+1’s critics or defenders. With its legacy still very much unwritten, the P5+1 might nonetheless establish a precedent for dealing with future cases of threatened proliferation or explicit terrorist threats or (especially) the convergence of the two. That is, a coalition of the willing approach in a pragmatic, contact group-type format that is adopted to suit specific circumstances. In this scenario, national diplomatic resources are mobilised together with those of relevant IOs such as the EU outside of the discredited UNSC.

A further illustrative example is the multinational antipiracy effort in the Indian Ocean. It involves loose coordination of a flotilla including vessels from the US and NATO as well as China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Yemen (Patrick 2014:62). Both of these examples illustrate the extent to which informal, ad hoc, mini-lateral governance structures could be used to realize security objectives where formal, global governance structures are unable to do so.

Generally, however, global security governance is patchy, weakly institutionalised, and marked by considerable diversity. At its apogee is the UN Security Council. But it suffers from chronic collective action problems (for instance, on Syria) and its legitimacy is increasingly challenged. The recent emergence of regional organisations with security ambitions (including the EU) might be taken to mean that regionalism is on the march in global security governance. But no regional security organisation has come anywhere close to the collective security commitments to which NATO states commit themselves nor to the operational capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance. Security governance remains mostly a national concern, with little sign of it becoming truly globalised. But a turn towards greater diversity may well be in the works.

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8 P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany.
3. Global Economic Governance

Perhaps the world’s most perceptive practitioner-philosopher of global economic governance is Pascal Lamy, who has served at all three of the most important levels of governance – national, regional and global – as well as in the private sector. Lamy compares each of the levels of governance in which he has served to the three states of mass: the national level is solid, the regional level is liquid, while the global level is gaseous. As such, “[t]he challenge with global governance today is to try to move from its current gaseous state to a more solid one” (Lamy 2012:727).

It is the economic realm where the map of global governance is most solid. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a treaty-based IO that has developed its own binding system of international law since its creation in 1995. It is often forgotten that the creation of the WTO was not even foreseen in the Punta el Este Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round of global trade talks in 1986. It was only 4 years later, when Canada suggested establishing a Multilateral Trade Organization, that a new IO to enforce the outcome of the negotiations was put on the agenda (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009:57). Crucially, the EU threw its weight behind the idea roughly at the time when it was “completing” its own internal market. Given initial US opposition to the proposal (subsequently reversed), it is no exaggeration to suggest that the WTO would never have been created without strong European support.

The map of global governance also features the other Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which (respectively) are designed to provide financial and technical assistance to developing countries and promote monetary policy cooperation. Yet, it is no exaggeration to conclude that, together, the three Bretton Woods institutions are vilified more often than they are praised by political economists – especially those focused on development – for enforcing a developed country agenda that keeps poor states that are already poor. The high but unrealised ambitions of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda after its launch in 2001 are indicative. The mutiny of developing states led by Brazil, China and India at the 2003 Cancun WTO summit against a US and EU-backed draft agreement derailed Doha and left it that way for another 10 plus years. The limited – both in scope and time – package reached at the WTO’s 2013 Bali summit hardly changed the equation, especially as its implementation became stalled by (mostly) Indian objections. Equally, it is unclear that recent attempts to give developing states greater representation and stakes in the World Bank and IMF have fundamentally altered general discontent in the developing world with their methods and objectives (see Tentori and Zandonini 2013).

If there is a single, elemental problem that characterises global economic governance, it may be that formal IOs – once created with specific missions and rules – find it difficult if not impossible to adapt when new challenges arise that do not squarely fit within their remit. The WTO is a case in point. It was created in 1995 with two main functions: legislative, to foster new trade agreements; and judicial, to resolve trade disputes. The legislative function has been subject to political stalemate while the judicial function has continued to operate in a political vacuum, applying rules that are either nearly 20 years old or are improvised to deal with contingencies that the old rules never foresaw. In the latter case, the WTO risks the accusation that it is “stepping out of bounds – in essence making new rules” that lack political legitimacy (Iida 2004:222).

Meanwhile, political pressures have accumulated over time for global economic governance to tackle development, environmental, labour and other “trade and” issues (that is, issues on which trade touches but only indirectly). Arguably, the WTO does a credible job in its judicial function of resolving trade disputes. But,
equally, the WTO is clearly “less effective when measured with regard to the more demanding dimensions, such as creating a level playing field and balancing trade and nontrade concerns” (Iida 2004:222).

As in the case of security governance, one obvious solution is to create more informal governance structures that can adapt flexibly when new and urgent economic problems demand solutions. The Group of 20 (G20) is a case in point. Its creation was a response to two developments: the worst economic slump since the 1930s and the dramatic rise of new economic players. After the global crash in 2008, it quickly became clear that existing forums – such as the Group of 8 industrialised states – were inadequate for striking a division of policy labour for stimulating recovery and eschewing protectionism because they excluded key players such as Brazil, India and China (three of the BRICs), as well as Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia, and others. As such, the G20 – formed initially in 1999 – was upgraded quickly to bring together the most powerful economic ministers in governments representing 80 per cent of the world’s population and 90 per cent of its economic activities (Jokela 2011:17). Table 2 below gives us an idea as to who the largest economies in the world are.

<table>
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<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Power index</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
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The rise of emerging economies necessitated an informal venue of discussion and dialogue at global level, which led to the G20. The G20’s actual record in forging and implementing a policy response to the Great Recession has been mixed (see Patrick 2014:63-4). It still lacks any institutional home or a single permanent official, let alone a set of agreed rules or enforcement mechanisms. Yet, it is precisely its informal nature that leads to confident predictions about its future that “the G20 will almost certainly broaden its agenda to include climate change and development” (de Vasconcelos 2011:5). Notably in a transatlantic context, the G20 mimics the P5+1 in its inclusion of the EU, which is designated as its 20th member alongside 19 nation-states.
The emergence of the EU as a player in global economic governance raises the question of whether our current era is witnessing a new wave of regionalism, with regional economic institutions such as Mercosur, APEC and NAFTA undergoing retrenchment and refinement even as others – such as the AU and SCO – make strides in governing economic cooperation (see Mansfield and Milner 1999). A classic question arising is whether regional economic governance undermines or encourages global economic governance. On both questions, clear-cut answers are illusive because of so much nuance and variation.

To illustrate, the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have agreed preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with China, India, Japan, South Korea and Australia/New Zealand. ASEAN also has committed to creating an “ASEAN Economic Community” together with 10 other Asian states – including Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines – featuring a single market and production base by 2015. The trend is not confined to Asia, as “[a]ll but a few members of the WTO currently belong to a PTA” (Mansfield and Milner 1999:620). Still, it remains an open question whether they are viewed by their participants as complementary to or a substitute for global trade agreements.

The EU’s own recent posture on trade does not make this question any less open. It has recently agreed PTAs with South Korea, Singapore, Canada and is currently in negotiations with (most dramatically) the US, Mercosur, Japan and a diverse range of others. A “deep and comprehensive” PTA with Ukraine, agreed in 2011-12, became subject to a political tug of war between the Union (supported by the US) and Russia in 2014 that fostered a domestic political crisis in Kiev that forced a change of government, Russian annexation of Crimea, and the equivalent of a (Russian-provoked) civil war in eastern Ukraine while the whole world watched. Economic governance may be the stuff of technocrats and obscure market forces, but it also can be the source of considerable political drama.

Perhaps the point is most vividly illustrated in the move by the EU and US to negotiate a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), as first signalled by Barack Obama in his 2013 US State of the Union address. Estimates varied wildly about how many entrenched obstacles to a comprehensive agreement could be overcome and how much additional economic growth and wealth a deal might create. Nevertheless, TTIP was a potential game-changer in global economic governance. Despite the economic rise of emerging states, the two sides still accounted for around 40 per cent of the global economy. Any binding TTIP agreement on (say) regulatory cooperation or investment rules was almost certain to be “exported” to the global level eventually, since the BRICs and others would have little choice but to adopt them. Simultaneous negotiations between the US and most Asian states (except China) on a Trans-Pacific Partnership similarly reinforced the sense that the near-term evolution of global economic governance seemed likely to be driven by developments at the regional or region-to-region levels, not the multilateral, global level per se.

In a broader sense, it is impossible to avoid the question of whether the post-2008 economic crisis caused a permanent and unprecedented loss of credibility for Western liberal capitalism globally. One consequence has been doubt about the durability of the most important and successful – until now – project of the 20th century: European integration. Relatedly, severe political and economic problems that have been part and parcel of the economic crisis have caused both Europeans and Americans to become inward-looking. Inequality and unemployment have increased drastically in the US since 2008 (see Luce 2012, Packer 2013). Polls suggested that, for the first time, a majority of American citizens thought that the US “should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (Pew Research Center 2013). Meanwhile, Europe’s recovery from the economic crisis was slower and patchier than America’s, with many economists viewing the continent’s economic outlook as gloomy (see Renda 2013).
While the transatlantic partners turn inwards, emerging powers including the BRICS and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) continue to outgrow the US and EU significantly. Even though they are still far from matching American and European levels of socio-economic development, the West now faces a massive challenge from non-western players in the global economy (Tentori and Zandonini 2013). Of course, when GDP per capita incomes of the US and EU are compared with the BRICs and MINT, a huge gap still separates them and the West. Emerging powers all still face significant domestic political problems that must be overcome for them to become truly major players in global governance (Cox 2012). Still, the question is now less whether wealth and power are moving away from North Atlantic democracies than what kind of global political order will emerge as a consequence (Ikenberry 2011).

In short, global governance may be more solid and less “gaseous” in the economic realm than any other. But, perhaps because solid, established, institutionalised fora have not kept pace with shifts of power, the rapid pace of globalisation, or the urgency of the post-2008 financial crisis, alternative paths to economic governance are now actively being explored. Predicting an outcome for global economic governance is perilous. But the picture that emerges is, again, one that appears to embrace greater diversity and one that relies on informal or regional governance structures.

4. Global Environmental Governance

We might reasonably conclude that, given the scale and urgency of the threat, global environmental governance is where multilateralism is weakest. Yet, significant development of environmental governance has occurred over the past 50 years. Impressive political investments have yielded numerous treaties, instruments of soft law, and a general recognition that environmental protection is moral imperative for all governments and peoples.

Still, global environmental governance remains weak compared to other realms of governance – such as trade, investment or human rights – in terms of generating international law that can be enforced through compulsory dispute resolution (Francioni and Bakker 2013a). The problem has been acknowledged through, particularly, the 2005 World Summit outcome on reform of the UN Charter, which sought to create such a mechanism. No meaningful progress strengthened the argument of advocates of “good enough” global governance that the UN system, along with most other formal IOs, remains sclerotic, stagnant, and a barrier more than a handmaiden of innovative international solutions (see Patrick 2014).

Yet, one formal IO that has emerged both as an environmental policy innovator within its own region as well as a leader of global governance initiatives on climate change is the European Union. Europe’s emissions trading system (EUTS) – the cornerstone of its “domestic” commitment to climate action – has been subject to frequent criticism, not least because of its emission cap’s lack of flexibility and inability to react to changes in wider economic conditions (Laing et al 2013), and its issuing of so many emissions allowances that incentives to cut them were undermined (Borghesi and Montini 2013). A media storm followed the 2009 Copenhagen summit when the EU’s negotiators were literally not in the room when an outcome was agreed; leading to the impression that Europe was being marginalised in global environmental governance.

Yet, in numerous ways the EUTS has been an “impressive achievement” (Ellerman 2013:8) and a model for other major players including China, India and even Iran.9 The EU also showed leadership in the salvaging of the Kyoto

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9 See “Iran plans emissions trade market, official says”, Reuters, 16 February 2014; http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/16/iran-carbon-market-idUSL6N0LL0AP20140216.
protocol and, perhaps above all, taking substantive environmental policy steps domestically that confirmed its credibility as a global leader. In some senses, it filled a leadership void left by the US's inability to forge a domestic political consensus on climate action. The result was a transfer of guardianship but one "made easier by the common cultural heritage and shared values between the two parties": that is, the US and Europe (Ellerman 2013:14). Whatever one's stance on the EU's record as a global actor or the durability of western power, climate change is an arena analogous to trade in that, if one of the transatlantic partners cannot lead, then the other has the potential to offer it.

Moreover, it is simplistic to dismiss the US as making no contribution to global environmental governance because of federal gridlock in Washington. Individual American states, such as California and Massachusetts, have been pioneers in developing regional greenhouse gas initiatives (RGGIs) with other states that effectively act as carbon trading systems. California – with an economy roughly the size of the UK's – has set higher targets for emissions reductions than other states and created a greenhouse gas registration system that closely monitors emissions. The US states not only implement federal environmental laws, they also issue more than 90 per cent of all environmental permits and conduct more than three-quarters of all environmental enforcement actions (Selin and VanDeveer 2010:345). US state-level initiatives to create networks to develop and enforce environmental standards "not only match European ambitions, they surpass them" (Bomberg and Schlosberg 2008:343). By some estimates, the US is likely to achieve significant emissions reductions by 2020. The call in early 2014 by the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, for a global climate treaty within the next year, in light of "scientific proof" that climate change was threatening not only the environment but world economy, gave ammunition to those who expressed optimism about US re-engagement in environmental diplomacy (Purvis et al 2013).10

Environmental activism by US states and other sub-national units of government, as well as by the EU, reveals two points of consensus in debates about global environmental governance. First, there is remarkably little appetite for the creation of a super-organization analogous to the WTO to help solve the crisis of global environmental governance. As Najam (2003:367) argues, the crisis "is one of governance, of which organizational structure is but one element and, in this case, a relatively small element at that". Second, as Fracksoni and Bakker (2013a) prescribe, a redefinition of the principle of sovereignty is needed to extend to "environmentally responsible sovereignty", in which each unit of government faces up to its responsibility to protect the global environment. According to this vision, national and sub-national courts and agencies would seize on their (significant) powers to advance environmental governance, and a bottom-up approach would facilitate not only the participation of public authorities but also the private sector and civil society.

In short, environmental protection appears an increasingly important realm of global governance. It also is one in which the US and Europe are hardly diminishing powers, partly because emerging powers find environmental protection too costly and divergent from their economic development goals. Perhaps above all, effective governance structures seem unlikely to result from the creation of any new, traditional, multilateral IO that seeks to impose solutions on the traditionally sovereign state.

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5. Global Governance of Human Rights

Human rights emerges as another realm of global governance where debates rage about how much progress has been made and how it might be furthered. On one hand, human rights norms clearly have been increasingly codified into rules that are enforceable through (especially) the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Other norms such as the “Responsibility to Protect” have gained currency in ways that both legitimise state action, such as humanitarian intervention, and yield a different quality of security by making the basic unit to be secured the individual rather than the state (Shaw et al 2006, Francioni and Bakker 2013b). These developments have provided grist to the mills of those who claim that the 21st century has witnessed the emergence of a “new multilateralism” that demands more of states than traditional forms and features fewer opt-outs, vetoes and weighted voting mechanisms to coax Great Powers to participate (see Bouchard and Peterson 2011).

On the other, the failure of the US as well as others – including China, India, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia – to accede to the ICC leads Goldsmith (2003) and others to view the creation of the Court as “self-defeating”. The argument is that its existence risks discouraging these states from engaging in activities that promote human rights and may actually decrease the impunity of those who violate international human rights norms. Numerous studies have found a wide discrepancy between the number of human rights treaties that have been ratified and continuing human rights violations internationally (Risse and Börzel 2012:14). Others have suggested that the main subjects of international law – states – are responsible for fewer human rights violations than non-state actors such as firms or rebel groups.

For their part, Risse and Börzel (2012) argue that a “new agenda” in human rights protection must embrace more investment in the capacity of states to enforce and comply with human rights norms. Research on human rights tends to produce a false divide between “quantitative pessimists and qualitative optimists,” with views about whether global governance is advancing or declining determined by researchers’ choice of methods (Risse and Börzel 2012:14). In fact, incidences of human rights violations may track with the global advance of democratisation as many states experience a decline in their capacity to enforce the law as they democratis. Traditional means for encouraging states to comply with international norms – coercion, incentives or persuasion – are ineffective when applied to states that wish to respect human rights but are simply too weak to do so. An important policy implication is that investments in the promotion of democracy must extend to state capacity-building via financial and technical assistance, as US and European democracy promotion policies already do (Risse and Börzel 2013:15). Another lesson – which the EU learned the hard way from the shock of the Arab Spring – is that democracy promotion also must extend to investing in civil society, whose capacity for holding newly democratic regimes to account on human rights can be just as important as state capacity for law enforcement (see Babayan and Viviani 2013).

Yet, whatever the west does to try to advance the global governance of human rights, Europe and (especially) the US risk having their efforts undermined by their perceived hypocrisy in a so-called “war on terrorism.” One of the most thoughtful of all IR scholars is clear that “[t]he greatly increased normative ambition of international society is nowhere more visible than in the field of human rights and democracy,” but also that “human rights and democracy have become stark symbols of division and confrontation rather than well-institutionalized reflections of a shared humanity” (Hurrell 2007:143). One reason why is the mismatch between the words and deeds of the US and its allies in a counterterrorism effort in which (according to George W. Bush administration) “there are no rules” and it is legitimate “to deny protection to people who do not deserve protection” (Hurrell
A new security agenda focused on preventing catastrophic terrorism makes unavoidable thorny moral dilemmas linked to choices about policy cooperation with unsavory regimes such as those of Pakistan, Yemen or Uzbekistan, extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects, or extrajudicial killings via drone strikes.

It is difficult to deny that liberal solidarist visions in which respect for human rights is a core ambition and which are embraced globally have fallen victim to power-politics since 9/11. We even find signs of heightened cynicism within western societies. US public support for efforts to establish democracy internationally plummeted from 52 per cent to 37 per cent in only two years after 2005, and have stayed that low subsequently (Babayan 2013:10).

In short, the realm of human rights reveals starkly how, in retrospect, rarified earlier debates about global governance now seem “to have skirt[ed] rather easily over the problem of managing power, especially unequal power, and the difficulties of mediating between conflicting values. Politically [they] tended to assume far too easily that the end of the Cold War had led to an underlying consensus on certain core liberal values and that the power of the liberal West could be harnessed, relatively unproblematically, to shared and common purposes” (Hurrell 2007:15).

An important concern here is the universal acceptance of Western human rights. In large chunks of the world, there is significant resistance to such norms as gender equality – as seen in Pakistan, India, and sub-Saharan Africa, or to individual liberties such as freedom of speech. Whatever steps the US and Europe now take to try to promote the global observance of human rights, such efforts must heed the warning that “[a]ttempts to move too rapidly towards the enforcement of international norms undermine the importance of consensus and the need for self-enforcement on which most international legal regulation will continue to be based” (Hurrell 2007:163).

Conclusion

Our broad sketch of global governance in four domains of IR leads us to three broad conclusions about where things stand and where they might be heading. First, global governance seems to be in a state of some considerable flux. One important reason why is simply because “[i]n global governance, as elsewhere, necessity is the mother of invention” (Patrick 2014:63). The P5+1, G20 and the antipiracy initiative off the Horn of Africa are all examples of purpose-built governance mechanisms whose memberships and contributions reflect pragmatism and group together states with relevant IOs. None were formed within the UN system or are based on treaties.

Another cause of flux is that the greatest gap between demand for and supply of global governance exists in the spaces that no state controls but on which all depend. These spaces together constitute what Patrick (2014:67) calls the (new) global commons: the domains of maritime, outer space and cyberspace. All seem likely to be governed on a piecemeal basis by multiple regimes, some of which already exist but will need to be supplemented by new, purpose-built ones. The global appetite for formal, treaty-based governance through formal IOs appears muted in the middle of the 21st century’s second decade.

Keohane (2002:203) helpfully reminds us that “[g]overnance can be accomplished by law, norms, markets and architecture.” In other words, the creation of new, multilateral IOs that develop and enforce a binding system
of law is only one option. However, what is unclear is whether a pragmatic, coalition of the willing approach to
global governance is sustainable in the longer term. After reviewing a number of areas where the US actively
supports international agreements to which it is not a signatory – such the ICC and Ottawa Treaty on landmines
– Kaye (2013:124) concludes that “stealth multilateralism is not a long-term answer, because many global
solutions require the binding force and permanence that only treaties can provide.”

A second theme that arises from consideration of Transworld’s four chosen areas of study is that a strict, dogmatic
interpretation of state sovereignty is a powerful barrier to effective, modern global governance. Especially in the
environmental realm, the contributions of the individual US states and the EU itself shows that “environmentally
responsible sovereignty” may be exercised by a variety of units of government that are not states. Equally,
however, even where states are the dominant players in global governance – as in the security or economic
realms – we find advancing regional cooperation and a greater reliance on non-governmental actors. Again,
modern global governance must be pragmatic and cannot rely exclusively on treaty-based IOs whose members
are exclusively states. Even where global cooperation is least “gaseous” – the economic realm – cynicism about
the dysfunctionality of existing IOs is evidence in verdicts such Hurrell’s (2007:209): “the most striking feature of
global economic governance is the disarray of existing institutions and the absence of consensus on the values
and purposes for which new and improved institutions might be needed.”

Third and finally, the rise of the rest – the BRICs, MINT and so on – does not thus far appear to have endowed
the west with a truly common agenda in global governance. Predictably, recent works on transatlantic relations
have appeared that insist that “[i]t is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans do not occupy
the same world,” complain that they have wallowed “for too long in the narcissism of minor differences,” and
contend that “the West remain[s] the master of its fate within the international multilateral order” (Lagadec
2012:1, 179). Conversely, it is well-established in past as well more recent works that simple, binary portrayals of
“unilateral America, multilateral Europe” are simplistic to the point of caricature (Pollack 2003, Kaye 2013).

In any case, the US and Europe face formidable obstacles – particularly due to internal political conditions – to
collective action in reforming and extending global governance. To illustrate, the main barrier to TTIP at the time
of writing was not divergence in the US and EU’s models of economic governance (as daunting as they were
and are). Rather, it was the stubborn unwillingness of Obama’s own Democratic party political allies to grant
his administration Trade Promotion Authority (previously “fast track”), so that the US Congress would approve
or reject a deal without amendments in a straight, up or down vote.11 Or, consider the opinion gap between
Americans and Europeans on the desirability of drone strikes, with 56 per cent of US citizens approving of them
compared to only 38 per cent of Germans and Poles, 37 per cent of French citizens, and a startling 5 per cent
of Greeks (Drake 2013). Finally, for all of the “work arounds” successive US administrations have employed to
support without joining multilateral agreements (see Kaye 2013:119-21), it strains credibility when the US insists
that China respect the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in its dangerous island sovereignty disputes with
Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam and others while Washington itself still has not acceded to UNCLOS.

Global governance has advanced by leaps and bounds in recent decades, but mostly through ad hoc, even
ad-libbed measures. The map that we have sketched is more a composite of four different diagrams than one
single, simple plot. In the absence of a dramatic reversal of globalization, which is barely imaginable, demand for
global governance will continue to spur efforts to increase its supply. The US and Europe still retain considerable
capacity to lead in supplying it. But they will need to reconcile their own differences, address perceived inequities

in the current architecture of global governance, and be both creative and inclusive in generating proposals for strengthening and extending it.

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In an era of global flux, emerging powers and growing interconnectedness, transatlantic relations appear to have lost their bearings. As the international system fragments into different constellations of state and non-state powers across different policy domains, the US and the EU can no longer claim exclusive leadership in global governance. Traditional paradigms to understand the transatlantic relationship are thus wanting. A new approach is needed to pinpoint the direction transatlantic relations are taking. TRANSWORLD provides such an approach by a) ascertaining, differentiating among four policy domains (economic, security, environment, and human rights/democracy), whether transatlantic relations are drifting apart, adapting along an ad hoc cooperation-based pattern, or evolving into a different but resilient special partnership; b) assessing the role of a re-defined transatlantic relationship in the global governance architecture; c) providing tested policy recommendations on how the US and the EU could best cooperate to enhance the viability, effectiveness, and accountability of governance structures.

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