7PQ site
Oct 062014

Transworld Paper No. 38

by Anne-Marie Le Gloannec and Manuel Muniz

The transatlantic security relationship is built on strong and enduring shared values. Americans and Europeans share, on the whole, similar perceptions about the nature of power, the norms that should guide relations among states, as well as a desire to promote democracy and basic human rights. The US and Europe also share most of their security objectives, this being particularly true when speaking of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and tackling state weakness around the world. Not surprisingly, therefore, our elite survey revealed that elites across the Atlantic are supportive of each other’s role in maintaining international security, and wish to remain partners through NATO. However, the partnership is exposed to a serious risk of fragmentation driven by changes in the international landscape, mainly the rise of multipolarity and the emergence of China as a major security player in East Asia, and by events with significant internal implications such as the financial crisis that started in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis and the emergence or multiplication of crises from Libya and Mali to the Middle East and Ukraine. These developments could easily pull the transatlantic partners in different directions, perhaps more so than any other change of the past half-century, creating tensions between the two, and bringing into question the usefulness of their alliance.


Jun 052014

Transworld Paper No. 29

by Philip Everts, Pierangelo Isernia and Francesco Olmastroni

The paper compares the attitudes and preferences of American and European public opinion along four major dimensions of international security: threat perceptions, sense of community, support for Atlantic partnership and institutions, and orientation toward the use of military force.

After a retrospective overview of the relevance of foreign and security policy issues to the public, a thorough review of the existing polling data shows that Europeans and Americans have a similar structure of belief along these four dimensions. They have comparable perceptions of threats, domestic priorities and comparable perceptions of friends and allies and a strong affinity for each other. Europeans and Americans agree upon the relative distribution of power in the world and on the relative importance of economic versus military strength. Most Europeans and Americans are internationalists and Atlanticists. They share a belief in both the necessity and effectiveness of multilateral, common action and international institutions. The only area on which the differences in views seem to be more stable is on the suitability and acceptability of the use of military force, with Europeans giving a higher priority to soft tools than Americans.


Oct 012012

Transworld Working Paper 03

by Maria G. Cowles
and Michelle Egan

Despite recent perceptions that the end of the Cold War deprived the transatlantic partnership of its central rationale, successive American administrations have faced the challenge of reassuring European leaders that they share common interests in the international arena. Europeans have alternated between full embrace of US views, voicing limited disagreement on certain issues, and occasional episodes of acute discord.

Disagreements over China, nuclear strategy, monetary policy, trade, development policy, amongst others, caused hand-wringing in Washington and European capitals long before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. This is not to suggest that structural change in the international system, including the rise of the BRICS and a shift in US interests toward Asia, should be discounted, but does warrant caution in asserting that the transatlantic relationship is now transitioning to an unprecedented path.